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  41. Introduction 
Rent seeking is defined as the socially costly pursuit of winning a contestable prize 
or a monopoly rent. When self-interested individuals are involved in rent seeking 
activities, their private returns come from redistribution of wealth from others rather than 
from wealth creation, and so the aggregate economy stagnates. This is a common-pool, 
prisoners’ dilemma situation.
1
Rent seeking occurs mainly through the public sector. The monopoly rent that the 
government creates - via coercive taxation, regulation, etc - generates a prize worth 
pursuing (see e.g. Hillman, 2003, chapter 6). Then, focusing on rent seeking through the 
public sector, an important form is competition for higher subsidies and transfers, lower 
taxes and other extra fiscal privileges. This can be called rent-seeking competition from 
state coffers. 
In this paper, we incorporate rent-seeking competition from state coffers into an 
otherwise standard dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model and calibrate it 
to the Greek economy over 1961:1-2005:4. Greece is particularly suitable for such an 
investigation as it has a rich and distorting tax-spending system (see e.g. Angelopoulos 
and Philippopoulos, 2007). It also scores poorly in international rankings of institutional 
quality (see e.g. the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) index). Further, there is a 
lot of anecdotal evidence that interest groups (e.g. public sector trade unions, industrial 
associations, professional associations, even individuals with the right connections) 
compete with each other for privileges at the expense of the general “public interest”.
2 
We thus expect that rent seeking activities can contribute to explaining the post-war 
Greek experience in cycles and growth. We also aim to quantify the extent of rent 
seeking and its macroeconomic implications. A similar theoretical model has been 
calibrated to a representative Euro country by Angelopoulos et al. (2009).   
A key feature of our model is that the state collects tax revenues to finance public 
goods and services, but each self-interested individual uses a part of his/her private 
                                                 
1 See e.g. Tullock (1967, 1980), Krueger (1974), Becker (1983), Baumol (1990), Murphy et al. (1991) and 
Hillman and Ursprung (2000). For surveys of rent seeking, see Drazen (2000, chapter 8), Mueller (2003, 
chapter 15) and Hillman (2003, chapter 6).    
2 See Hillman (2003, chapter 6) for a discussion of “public” and “special” interests in this context.     
  5resources to extract a fraction of that revenue for his/her own personal benefit.
3 The 
amount extracted by each individual is proportional to the private resources he/she 
allocates to rent seeking relative to aggregate resources allocated to rent seeking by all 
individuals. This redistributive struggle hurts the macro-economy both directly and 
indirectly: the direct effect arises because there are few resources available to finance 
public infrastructure and other socially useful services; the indirect effect arises because 
the possibility of extraction distorts individuals’ incentives (before the successful rent 
seeker receives the prize) by pushing them away from productive work. The latter 
indirect effect is also known as “misallocation of talent” (see Murphy et al., 1991). Both 
effects reduce the prize that initiated the struggle in the first place. Nevertheless, although 
rent seeking is socially costly, it is rational from an individual point of view; this is a 
coordination problem.  
We calibrate the above model to Greek quarterly data over the period 1961:1-
2005:4. Our model does well in reproducing the key stylized facts of business cycles in 
the Greek economy. By stylized facts, we mean the volatility, persistence and co-
movement of the main macroeconomic time series. Actually, the introduction of rent 
seeking activities moves the model in the right direction vis-à-vis the data. Then, there 
are three main results.  
First, in the long run of our model economy, rent seekers grab 42.79% of total 
transfers which translate to 8.49% of GDP. In other words, privileged spending subsidies 
and tax treatments amount to 8.49% of output produced. This makes Greece the worst 
economy in the Euro area in terms of rent seeking magnitude (see Angelopoulos et al., 
2009, for other euro countries).  
Second, we shed some light on the key determinants of the degree of rent seeking 
activities. The latter depends of course on almost all exogenous variables and calibrated 
parameters. Focusing on a calibrated parameter that provides a measure of “institutional 
quality”
4, sensitivity long-run analysis reveals that further deteriorations in institutional 
                                                 
3 See also e.g. Hillman and Ursprung (2000), Mohtadi and Roe (1998, 2003), Mauro (2004) and Park et al. 
(2005). In all these models, the “common pool” is (some type of) government assets.      
4 “Institutional quality” is measured by a calibrated technology parameter that translates individual rent-
seeking efforts into actual extraction. In other words, this parameter measures the effectiveness of rent 
  6quality will lead to substantial reductions in output. Specifically, the elasticity of output 
with respect to institutional quality is around 1 in the long run of our economy, which 
means that deterioration (resp. improvement) of institutional quality by say 2% will 
reduce (resp. increase) output by around 2%.   
The third result is normative. We quantify the potential general equilibrium welfare 
gains from improvements in institutional quality. Applying a welfare criterion used 
frequently in micro-founded general equilibrium models (see e.g. Lucas, 1990), we find 
that even small improvements in institutional quality can result in substantial social 
welfare gains. For instance, an improvement of institutional quality by around 2% could 
raise long-term welfare by around 5%. This is a substantial gain relative to those typically 
found in the literature on policy reforms (see e.g. Lucas, 1990, and Cooley and Hansen, 
1992).  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical 
model. A quantitative study is in sections 3 and 4. Welfare calculations are in section 5. 
Section 6 concludes and discusses limitations and extensions. 
 
2. Theoretical model  
2.1 Description of the model   
The theoretical model is as in Angelopoulos et al. (2009). There is a large number 
of identical households and (for simplicity) an equal number of identical firms. 
Households own capital and labour and rent them to firms. They are also engaged in rent-
seeking competition with each other for fiscal privileges.
5 Rent seeking can come at a 
                                                                                                                                                   
seeking efforts. Improvements (resp. deteriorations) in institutional quality mean that ceteris paribus the 
same individual rent-seeking activities are translated into less (resp. more) actual extraction, which may 
reflect better (resp. worse) laws, legal systems, etc. 
5 We could assume that firms also rent seek like households. This is not important since households are 
firm-owners in this class of models. We could also assume that government officials (bureaucrats and 
politicians) rent seek. From the viewpoint of self-interest, government officials do not differ from other 
individuals so that by adding more types of rent-seeking individuals would not change our main results. On 
the other hand, if policy decisions are optimally chosen, introducing optimizing government officials - who 
choose inefficient policies and political favours in return for bribes, campaign contributions, political 
support, etc, where the latter are chosen by rent seeking private agents - would complicate the model 
considerably. Obviously, this is closely connected to lobbying and corruption, and the supply side of 
political favors in general. See the discussion in Hillman and Ursprung (2000, section 5).   
  7private cost: it requires effort (i.e. non-leisure time) time.
6 Hence, in addition to 
consumption, leisure and saving, each household also chooses optimally how to allocate 
its non-leisure time between productive work and rent-seeking activities.
7 Firms produce 
a homogenous product by using capital, labour and public infrastructure. The government 
uses tax revenues and issues bonds to finance four activities: public consumption (that 
provides direct utility to households), public investment (that augments the stock of 
public infrastructure providing production externalities to firms), a uniform lump-sum 
transfer to each household and, finally, extra fiscal privileges to rent seekers.   
Like in e.g. Becker (1983), we will focus on the demand side of rent seeking and its 
implications. The supply side of fiscal favors, e.g. why and how government officials and 
voters decide to offer these favors, and at what price, is not modeled. Thus, using the 
terminology of Hillman and Ursprung (2000, p. 204), the government is placed outside 
the population of rent seekers.     
We now formalize this scenario. Before doing so, we give some examples of rent 
seeking competition from state coffers.     
2.2 Examples of rent seeking from state coffers  
One can distinguish two categories of rent seeking (not mutually exclusive). The 
first category includes privileged transfers, subsidies and tax treatments. For instance, 
there are direct transfers in cash (e.g. targeted subsidies and other benefits) and non-cash 
(e.g. private use of public assets like state cars, extra health services and child benefits, 
etc), as well as indirect transfers (e.g. measures that increase the demand for an interest 
group’s services). There are also measures that reduce tax burdens (e.g. tax exemptions 
and loopholes designed to favor special interests) coupled with a rise in the average tax 
rate to make up for the lost revenues. In addition to legal forms, there can also be illegal 
forms of rent seeking (e.g. tax evasion, theft of funds for public programs, use of fake 
documents to get a privileged treatment, etc).  
                                                 
6 Trade unionism, participation in strikes and demonstrations, lobbying, etc, are costly activities. In general, 
rent seeking (winning a contestable prize) requires the expenditure of private resources (time, money, or 
both).       
7 See also e.g. Krueger (1974), Murphy et al. (1991), Hillman and Ursprung (2000), Mauro (2004) and Park 
et al. (2005), where individuals decide how to allocate their time between work and rent seeking.    
  8The second category of rent seeking includes privileged regulation and legislation 
that reduce competition (e.g. government-created barriers to entry, trade restrictions like 
tariffs and agricultural price supports), lead to disguised transfers (e.g. a public road may 
be planned to increase the value of certain pieces of real estate) or permit privileged 
avoidance of regulations intended to benefit the public. Again, there can be legal and 
illegal forms.   
Obviously, this list is not exhaustive (see e.g. Tanzi, 1998, Mueller, 2003, chapter 
15, and Hillman, 2003, chapter 6, for other examples). Although our setup is conceptually 
consistent with both categories, formally speaking, we model the first one.   
2.3 Households 
Each period t there are   identical households indexed by the superscript  , 
where  . The population size,  , evolves at a constant rate 
t N h
t N h ,..., 2 , 1 = t N 1 ≥ n γ  so that 
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where   denotes rational expectations conditional on the information set available at 
time zero,   is a time discount factor,   is  ’s  private consumption at time  , 
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t G  is average (per household) public consumption goods and services provided by the 
government at t, and   is  ’s leisure time at  . Thus, public consumption goods and 
services influence private utility through the value of the parameter 
h
t L h t
ψ  (see e.g. Aschauer, 
1985, and Christiano and Eichenbaum, 1992).  

























L G C u  (2) 
where  1 0 < < µ  and  0 ≥ σ  are parameters.  
  9Each household   saves in the form of capital,  , and government bonds,  . It 
receives interest income from capital,  , and government bonds,  , where   and 
 are respectively the gross returns to inherited capital and bonds,    and  . The 
household has one unit of time in each period and divides it between leisure,  , and 
effort,  ; thus,   in each period. It further divides its effort time,  , 
between productive work,  , and rent seeking activities,  , where 
 and   denote respectively the fractions of non-leisure time that 
the household allocates to productive work and rent seeking; thus, 
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  (3) 
where   and   are respectively consumption and income tax rates 
common to all agents,
1 0 < ≤
c
t τ 1 0 < ≤
y
t τ
9   is the wage rate,   is labour-augmenting technology common 
to all households that evolves at a constant rate 
t w t Z
1 ≥ z γ  so that  t z t Z Z γ = +1  where   
is given,   denotes government tax revenue (specified below) and 
0 0 > Z
t R 1 0 < ≤ t θ  is the 
economy-wide degree of extraction (also specified below).   
The budget constraint in (3) is standard except for the last term on its right-hand 
side. The idea behind this term is that, given a contestable prize denoted as  tt R θ , each 
self-interested agent attempts to extract a fraction of that prize, where the fraction 
depends on the amount of time and effort that an individual agent allocates to rent 
seeking relative to the time and effort allocated by all agents in the society. This is a 
                                                 
8 Since both   and  are optimally chosen, this is equivalent to choosing how to allocate one’s time to 





9 We assume that returns on government bonds are not taxed.  
  10widely-used rent seeking technology (see also e.g. Hillman and Ursprung, 2000, and 
Mueller, 2003, chapter 15), which is also similar to contest success functions used by the 
literature on property rights (see e.g. Hirshleifer, 1995). This standard model of rent 
seeking largely abstracts from institutional or political details.   
Note that in (3) each household can receive both a uniform lump-sum (non-
distor
c ing to:  
t t+1 (4) 
where the initial   is given. 
: 
ting) transfer and an extra (distorting) fiscal favour. The former reflects the idea that 
there are government programs independent of interest groups’ pressure (this can be 
related to social and political norms). The latter depends on the effort individuals spend in 
rent seeking activities and reflects the idea that fiscal privileges are provided only if the 
beneficiaries of those privileges apply pressure.
10    
Private holding of government bonds evolves ac ord
h h h D B B + =   t
0
h B
Private holding of capital evolves according to
h
























δ  (5) 
where the parameter   is a depreciation rate, the initial   is given, and the  1 0 < <
p δ 0
h K
parameter  0 ≥ ξ  captures internal adjustment costs on gross investment. This 
specification ensures that there are no adjustment costs in the long run (see below).   
Each household h acts competitively by taking prices, policy and economy-wide 
variables as given.
11 Thus, each h chooses  11 0 {, , , , }
hh h h h
tt t t t t CH K B η
∞
+ +=  to maximize (1)-
                                                 
10 See e.g. Mueller (2003, chapter 21) and Hillman (2003, chapter 6) for interest groups, transfers and the 
size of the government. See also Persson and Tabellini (2000, chapter 7) for special-interest politics.  
11 Each individual   is small by taking economy-wide variables ( h t θ ,   and ∑ ) as given.  
We could alternatively assume that each   internalizes the effects of his/her own actions on aggregate 











) 1 ( η
h
h j ≠  as given. This is not important regarding the 
features of a decentralized equilibrium. What is important is that there are (social) external effects.    
  11(2) subject to (3)-(5),  ,   and   given. The 
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δ . 
Condition (6a) is the optimality condition with respect to effort time,  , and 
equates the marginal value of leisure to the after-tax return to effort. Condition (6b) is the 
optimality condition with respect to the fraction of non-leisure time allocated to work vis-




t η . It implies that, in equilibrium, the return to work and the return to 
rent seeking should be equal. The next two conditions, (6c) and (6d), are standard Euler 
equations for   and  . The optimality conditions are completed by the  1
h
t K + 1
h
t B +
  12transversality conditions for the two assets, namely  0
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E β . 
2.4 Firms 
There are as many firms as households. Identical firms are indexed by the 
superscript  f , where  1,2,..., t f N = . Each firm produces an homogeneous product, 
f
t Y , 
by using private capital, 
f




t K . Its production function is: 
ε α ε α − − =








t K Q K A Y  (7) 
where   is stochastic total productivity (see below for its law of motion) and  0 > t A
1 , 0 < < ε α  are parameters (see e.g. Lansing, 1998, for a similar production function). 
Each firm  f  acts competitively by taking prices, policy and economy-wide 
variables as given. Thus, each  f  chooses 
f













t Q w K r Y − − = Π  (8) 















= ε  (9b) 
2.5 Government budget constraint  
In each period, the government collects tax revenues,  , by taxing consumption 
and income at the rates   and   respectively. Rent seekers can grab 
t R
1 0 < ≤
c
t τ 1 0 < ≤
y
t τ
tt R θ , where the economy-wide fraction 0 t 1 θ ≤ <  is modelled below. The government 
  13uses the remaining tax revenues,  t t R ) 1 ( θ − , and issues new bonds,  , to finance public 
consumption,  , public investment,  , and lump-sum transfers,  . Thus, the within-
period government budget constraint is: 
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η τ τ
tt R θ  can be read as both government revenue taken away (i.e. privileged tax treatments) 
and extra benefits recorded as expenditure (i.e. privileged spending subsidies). See 
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980, p.16) for a discussion of this equivalence between “tax 
expenditures” and “spend expenditures”.   








t G K K + − = + ) 1 ( 1 δ  (11) 
where   is a depreciation rate and initial 0
g δ << 1 0
g K  is given (for simplicity, we assume 
no adjustment costs for public capital). 
2.6 Exogenous stochastic variables and policy instruments   
The exogenous stochastic variables include the aggregate productivity,  , and five 
policy instruments,  . We assume that productivity and policy 
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where  ,  are means of the stochastic processes;  0 A
c y t i c s s s 0 0 0 0 0 , , , , τ τ a ρ , c y t i g ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ , , , ,  
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2.7 Economy-wide extraction  
To close the model, we specify the economy-wide degree of extraction ( 1 0 < ≤ t θ ). 
Following e.g. Zak and Knack (2001), Mauro (2004) and Park et al. (2005), we assume 
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) 1 ( η
θ θ  (13) 
where the parameter  0 0 ≥ θ  is a technology parameter that translates individual rent-
seeking efforts into actual extraction. Higher values of  0 θ  imply more “efficient” rent-
seeking technology, which reflects poor laws, permissive legal systems and easy 
corruption. Thus,  0 θ  is a measure of institutional quality, with higher (resp. lower) values 
meaning worse (resp. better) institutions. See below for further details.   
2.8 Decentralized Competitive Equilibrium (DCE) 
In a Decentralized Competitive Equilibrium (DCE): (i) Each individual household 
and each individual firm maximize respectively their own utility and profit by taking as 
                                                 
12 We could use a non-linear specification, or treat  t θ  as exogenous. This would not affect our main 
predictions.    
  15given market prices, government policy and economy-wide outcomes. (ii) Markets clear 
via price flexibility.
13 (iii) The government budget constraint is satisfied. This equilibrium 
holds for any feasible policy. We solve for a symmetric DCE. Equilibrium quantities will 
be denoted by letters without the superscripts h (which was used to indicate quantities 
chosen by households) and  f  (which was used to indicate quantities chosen by firms).  
The DCE is given by equations (1)-(13). Looking ahead at the long run where all 
components of the national income identity should grow at the same constant rate (the so-
called balanced growth rate), we transform these components in per capita and efficient 
unit terms to make them stationary. Thus, for any economy-wide variable  , where 
, we define 
t X
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be per capita non-leisure time. It is then straightforward to show that equations (1)-(13) 
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13 Thus, in each time period,   in the capital market,   in the labor 
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We thus have nine equations in the paths of  . This is 
given the paths of productivity,  , and the independent policy instruments, 
, whose motion has been defined in (12a-f) above. 
1 1 1 , , , , , , , , + + + t
g
t t t t
b











t s s s τ τ , , , ,
 
3. Calibration and long-run results   
We start by calibrating the model to the Greek economy. Our data come from 
OECD Economic Outlook. Data are quarterly and cover the period 1961:1-2005:4.     
3.1 Calibration and long-run solution   
Tables 1 and 2 report the average values of time-series in the data, calibrated 
parameter values and the resulting long-run solution. Our economy in the long run is 
presented in Appendix A.   
[Tables 1 and 2 around here] 
  17Table 2, column 1, reports the average values of  ,  ,   and   in the data, 
while the average quarterly real interest rate on public debt, 
y c/ y i/ h / by
b r , is 0.011, which means an 
annual value of 0.044. The average value of hours at work in the data is  . The 
average values of tax rates in the data are in Table 1. The income tax rate,  , is obtained 
as the ratio of the collected income tax revenue over GDP, while the consumption tax 
rate,  , as the ratio of collected indirect tax revenue over private consumption. Data 
averages of the three government spending-to-output ratios are also reported in Table 1.    





Our model includes some variables that - although clearly identifiable from a 
theoretical point of view - are hard to measure. Specifically, there are no data on the 
fraction of effort time devoted to rent seeking  ) 1 ( t η − and thus on time devoted to 
productive work ( t th η ). Also, public finance data do not distinguish between government 
spending arising from rent seeking activities and government spending independent of 
such activities; the data obviously contain both types, which means that  ,   and   







14 To deal with 
these measurement problems, we assume (a) any effort devoted to rent seeking takes 
place while at work; (b) any spending favors take the form of redistributive transfers. 
Assumption (a) reflects the popular view that trade unionism, lobbying, etc, are at the 
cost of actual hours of work (we thus distinguish hours at work  , which is measurable, 
from hours of productive work 
t h
t th η , which is unobservable). Assumption (b) is consistent 
with e.g. Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000), who argue that in the past thirty to forty years 
government spending growth has mainly been driven by interest groups and has taken the 
form of transfers/subsidies. Technically, these two assumptions mean that, in Appendix 
A, only two equations, (A.v) and (A.viii), are left with unobservable variables and hence 
are not used for calibration purposes, and that the government budget constraint (A.vi) 
becomes (A.vi’) which includes observables only. 
                                                 
)
14 We are grateful to Harald Uhlig for pointing this problem out to us. This implies that in the government 
budget constraint in equation (10), if we use the available data on government spending to measure  , 






t G tt R θ , we may have a double-counting problem. Note 
that since we use data on collected tax revenue, a similar problem does not arise in the case where rent 
seeking takes the form of tax favors. 
  18Some parameter values in Table 1 are set on the basis of a priori information. 
Following usual practice, the curvature parameter in the utility function (σ ) is set equal 
to  . The parameter  2 ψ , which measures the degree of substitutability/complementarity 
between private and public consumption in the utility function, is set equal to  ; as 
Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) explain, this means that government consumption is 
equivalent to a resource drain in the macro-economy. The gross population growth in the 
data is 
0
0014 . 1 = n γ . The private and public capital depreciation rates,   and  , are set 
equal to 0.0175 (or 0.07 annually) and 0.0075 (or 0.03 annually) respectively. The 
exponent of public capital in the production function (
p δ
g δ
ε α − − 1 ) is set equal to 0.0338, 
which is the average public investment to output ratio ( ) in the data (Baxter and King, 
1993, follow the same practice for the US). Following Kydland (1995), we set 
i s0
µ  (the 
weight given to consumption relative to leisure in the utility function) equal to the 
average value of   (see above). Both   (the initial level of technical progress) and   
(the level of long-run aggregate productivity) are scale parameters and are normalized to 
one (see also e.g. King and Rebelo, 1999). The growth rate of the exogenous labor 
augmenting technology, 
t h 0 Z 0 A
z γ , is 1.0047, which is the average GDP growth rate of the USA 
over the same period.   
The time discount factor (β ) is calibrated from equation (A.iii). The capital share 
(α ) is calibrated from equation (A.ii). Given the values of  3061 . 0 = α  and 
0338 . 0 ) 1 ( = − − ε α , the labor share is residually found to be  6601 . 0 = ε . The value of 
0 θ  (the extraction technology parameter) is calibrated from equation (A.i) giving 
4788 . 8 0 = θ . Note that these calibrated parameter values did not require any data on η.   
For the simulations below, we will also need to specify the parameters 
(autoregressive coefficients and variances) of the stochastic exogenous processes in 
(12a)-(12f). The coefficients  t i g ρ ρ ρ , ,  and the associated standard deviations,  t i g σ σ σ , , , 
in (12b)-(12d) are estimated via OLS from their respective   processes. Concerning 
(12a), we follow usual practice (see e.g. McCallum, 1989) by choosing the volatility of 
the Solow residual, 
) 1 ( AR
a σ , so that the actual and simulated series for GDP have the same 
  19variance. By the same token, we choose the persistence of the Solow residual,  a ρ , so that 
our simulated series of output mimics as close as possible the first-order autocorrelation 
of the actual series of output. These two properties are captured when  0212 . 0 = a σ  and 
675 . 0 = a ρ  respectively. Finally, we treat   and   in (12e)-(12f) as constant over 
time. This is justified by the fact that the tax rates change infrequently via tax reforms 






Table 2 reports the model’s long-run solution. This solution follows if we use the 
parameter values reported in Table 1 into equations (A.i)-(A.v), (A.vi’) and (A.vii)-(A.ix) 
in Appendix A and solve for the model’s endogenous variables. In this solution, we set 
the annual public debt-to-output ratio to be   (or 2.56 on a quarterly basis), which is 
the data average and very close to the reference rate of the Stability and Growth Pact 
(0.60), and then allow the public consumption-to-output ratio,  , to be endogenously 
determined to satisfy the within-period government budget constraint; this gives 
. In other words, in the long run of our model economy, government 
consumption as a share of GDP should drop from 0.1467 in the data to 0.0116 to get a 
well-defined long run. The long-run solution also gives 
64 . 0
c s0
0116 . 0 0 =
c s
8672 . 0 = η  and  2550 . 0 = θ . 
Thus, agents allocate only 86.72% of their effort time to productive work, while the rest 
13.28% goes to rent seeking activities. As a result, rent seekers grab 33.13% of tax 
revenues. The latter translates to 42.79% of total transfers or 8.49% of GDP, denoted as 
 and 
t g r/ θ y r / θ  respectively in the tables. Although these numbers may look high at 
first sight, it is important to point out that total transfers as a share of GDP are as high as 
19.85% in the data and also to remind the popular belief that, in many countries, a large 
part of transfers is the result of interest groups pressure. Moreover, our solution numbers 
are lower than previous estimates of rent seeking based on partial equilibrium and proxy 
calculations for other countries (see Mueller, 2003, p.355, for a review).   
3.2 Sensitivity analysis of the long run solution   
We now use the long-run solution to check sensitivity and comparative static 
properties. To save on space, we focus on the behavior of the degree of extraction 
  20(01 θ ≤< ) and output ( ), and how these two key endogenous variables are affected by 
exogenous variables and calibrated parameters. Specifically, we report the effects of 
small changes in the extraction technology parameter (
y
0 θ ), the income tax rate ( 0
y τ ), the 
consumption tax rate ( 0
c τ ), capital productivity (α ) and the growth rate of labor 
augmenting technology ( z γ ). Results are illustrated in Table 3.  
[Table 3 around here] 
An institutional deterioration (i.e. a higher  0 θ ) pushes individuals away from 
productive work to rent seeking (i.e. a higher θ ) and damages the pie (i.e. a lower  ). 
Increases in any of the tax rates (
y
00 ,
yc τ τ ) have similar effects, namely they lead to higher 
θ  and lower  y . Increases in capital productivity and labor augmenting technology (i.e. 
higher α  or  z γ ) lead to higher θ  and higher  y ; that is, a higher pie triggers rent seeking, 
but, despite the adverse effects from rent seeking, the net output effect is positive.    
  It is useful to present more details about the exact effect of changes in the key 
parameter,  0 θ . Results for long-run output are reported in Table 4. A deterioration of 
institutional quality by 2% (i.e. an increase of  0 θ  by 2% relative to its calibrated value in 
Table 1) reduces output by 1.9647%, while an improvement of institutional quality by 2% 
(i.e. a decrease of  0 θ  by 2% relative to its calibrated value in Table 1) increases output by 
2.0367%. Thus, the elasticity of output with respect to institutional quality is around 1 in 
the long run of our economy. These changes are driven by the direct and indirect effects 
from rent seeking discussed in the Introduction.  
[Table 4 around here] 
 
4. Linearized model and simulation results  
We continue with simulation results by studying second moment properties and 
impulse response functions. We start with the linearized decentralized competitive 
equilibrium.  
  214.1 Linearized decentralized competitive equilibrium   
We linearize (14a)-(14i) around the long-run solution (see Appendix A for the long 
run). Define  , where  ) ln (ln ˆ x x x t t − ≡ x is the model consistent long-run value of a 
variable  . It is then straightforward to show that the linearized DCE is a system 
, where 
t x
[] 0 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 0 1 1 0 1 1 = + + + + + z B z B x A x A E t t t t [ ]′ ≡ t t
g
t t t t
b
t t t t t k k k b h r y c i x 2 ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ ˆ η , 
,   and   are constant matrices of dimension 
10x10, 10x10, 10x6 and 10x4 respectively. The elements of   follow the   
processes in (12a)-(12d) - recall that tax rates have been assumed to be constant. Thus, 
we end up with a linear first-order stochastic difference equation system in ten variables, 
out of which three are predetermined ( ) and seven are jump 
( ). To solve it, we use the solution methodology in Klein (2000). 
We report that, when we use the calibrated values in Table 1, all eigenvalues are real and 
there are three eigenvalues with absolute value less than one, so that the model exhibits 
saddle-path stability.  






t t t s s s A z ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ ˆ 0 1 0 1 , , , B B A A
t z ˆ ) 1 ( AR
t
g
t t k k b ˆ , ˆ , ˆ
t t t
b
t t t t k h r y c i 2 ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ η
4.2 Second moment properties   
We simulate our model economy over the time period studied and evaluate its 
descriptive power by comparing the second moment properties of the series generated by 
the model to those of the actual Greek data. To get the cyclical component of the series, 
we take logarithms and apply the Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter of 
1600 for both the simulated and the actual data. We study the volatility, persistence and 
co-movement properties of some key variables,  .      h k k w h i c y
g η η, , , , , , , ,
Tables 5, 6 and 7 summarize respectively results for standard deviations (relative to 
that of output), first-order autocorrelations and cross-correlations with output. This is 
done both for the simulated series and the actual data.  
[Tables 5, 6 and 7 around here] 
Inspection of the above three Tables reveals that our model economy does well in 
reproducing the key stylized facts of the post-war Greek economy. We also report that the 
  22model scores better than the same model without rent seeking,
15 especially in terms of 
volatility in hours at work.
16 It is worth pointing out that the model does well without 
incorporating extra frictions (e.g. nominal and real rigidities, imperfect competition, 
heterogeneity, etc) that typically help a DSGE model with the data.  
4.3 Impulse response functions   
We compute the responses of the key endogenous variables (measured as 
deviations from their model-consistent long-run value) to a unit shock to the exogenous 
processes. We examine temporary shocks to total factor productivity, government 
consumption and government investment. Results are reported in Tables 8a-c 
respectively.    
[Tables 8a-c around here] 
Table 8a reports the effects of a temporary shock to total factor productivity,  . 
As is standard, an increase in   leads to more time allocated to productive work (i.e. 
t A
t A
t th η  rises). At the same time, in our model, an increase in   signals a larger contestable 
pie that pushes individuals to devote a larger fraction of hours at work to rent seeking (
t A
t η  
falls initially). As a result,   has to overshoot its value relatively to standard RBC 
models.  
t h
The full story is as follows. An increase in   increases income and this supports a 
rise in both current and - via consumption smoothing - future consumption. Since leisure 
is also a normal good, both current and future leisure have the tendency to follow 
consumption, namely to rise (or equivalently   to fall). Nevertheless, a higher   also 
raises labor productivity and the real wage (as well as output, investment and capital) and 
t A
t h t A
                                                 
15 A model without rent seeking is derived if we set   and hence  1 = t η 0 = t θ  at all  . Results for this 
special case are available upon request from the authors.  
t
16 The full model does better because, once there is a shock, the fraction of total hours at work allocated to 
productive work and the hours of productive work move in opposite directions, so that total hours at work 
have to overshoot their value relative to standard RBC models. In other words, we distinguish hours at 
work as observed in the data (which can also include rent seeking activities like trade unionism, lobbying, 
etc) from hours of productive work. This becomes obvious when we present impulse response functions 
below, while details are in Angelopoulos et al. (2009) who provide a comparison of the full model with the 
same model without rent seeking.   
  23creates a substitution effect that works in opposite direction by increasing the time spent 
in productive work,  t th η . Here the latter effect dominates so that the net effect on  t th η  is 
positive. This is as in most of the literature (see e.g. Kollintzas and Vassilatos, 2000). 
Here there is an extra effect due to rent seeking. Since  t η  has fallen,   has to rise more 
relatively to standard models to support the higher value of 
t h
t th η .     
Table 8b reports the effects of a temporary shock to government consumption as a 
share of output,  . An increase in   creates a negative wealth effect that reduces 
consumption, investment and (after the demand stimulant fades away) output. 
Concerning leisure, there are two opposite effects. On the one hand, because of lower 
income, leisure tends to fall (or equivalently   tends to rise) like consumption. On the 
other hand, a higher   lowers the return to labor (the wage rate) and creates a 








t th η ), 
which can be achieved by lower  t η  and/or lower  . Here, as the impulses show, the 
former (i.e. income) effect dominates so that both   and 
t h
t h t th η  rise. The rise in hours of 
productive work ( t th η ) is rather standard in the RBC literature. But here we have an 
additional effect: the lower return to productive work implies a lower  t η . In other words, 
individuals switch to rent seeking. Since  t η  falls,   has to rise more relatively to 
standard models to support the higher value of 
t h
t th η . 
Finally, Table 8c reports the effects of a temporary shock to government investment 
as a share of output,  . Although the response of the economy to a change in   
resembles that to a change in   in the very short run, after some time private 
consumption, investment and capital all rise above their initial long run values. Output 
and wages are also higher all the time contrary to what happened with an increase in  . 
Thus, after some periods of time, a shock to   works like a shock to productivity ( ) so 










t s t A
t η ,  t th η  and   in Table 8c are the same as those in Table 
8a.   
t h
  245. Institutional reforms and welfare implications  
We finally quantify the welfare gains from potential reforms. We focus on 
institutional reforms that ceteris paribus reduce the value of  0 θ . Recall that the value of 
0 θ  summarizes how easily rent-seeking attempts are translated into actual rent seeking, 
with reductions in  0 θ  making it harder (see equation (13)). In other words, as said above, 
reductions in  0 θ  reflect improvements in institutional quality.  
To welfare compare the existing economy to a reformed one, we follow Lucas e.g. 
(1990) by computing the percentage compensation in consumption that the household 
would need under the existing calibrated structure to be indifferent between this structure 
and a fictional reformed one. This percentage compensation in consumption is denoted by 
ζ . The value of ζ  provides a welfare measure that has a simple interpretation and is 
popular. We focus on the effects of such reforms upon long-run welfare. Details are in 
Appendix B.  
We first solve the model and compute the resulting long-run welfare under the 
existing structure, we then do the same under an assumed lower  0 θ , and finally find the 
value of ζ  that equates welfare in the two regimes. Numerical results are reported in 
Table 9. Institutional improvement (i.e. fall) of  0 θ  by say 1%, 2% and 3% could increase 
long-run welfare by 2.89%, 5.89% and 9.01% respectively. These are substantial gains. 
They are also within the range usually found in the literature on policy reforms. For 
instance, when Lucas (1990, section 4) compared long-run welfare under the actual tax 
structure in the US (where the average capital tax rate was 0.36) with long-run welfare 
under a Ramsey solution (where ceteris paribus the capital tax rate falls to zero), he found 
a welfare gain around 6% of private consumption.      




  256. Conclusions, discussion and extensions   
This paper incorporated rent-seeking competition from state coffers into an 
otherwise standard dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. It then calibrated the 
model to the post-war Greek economy. The main result is that rent seeking matters to, 
and hurts, the macro economy in Greece.   
In our model, rent seeking was defined as the expenditure of private resources used 
to influence government policy in the form of tax-spending favors. Government assets 
were assumed to be a common property or common pool. Then, as in all common-pool 
models, socially suboptimal behavior (e.g. rent seeking) can result from the attempt of 
rational individuals to extract common property for their own benefit. In other words, rent 
seeking and other forms of socially unproductive behavior arise because of the possibility 
that rents can be extracted (see the positive value of  t θ  in equation (3)). It is this 
possibility, jointly with decision making in a decentralized economy, which makes rent 
seeking optimal from an individual point of view. Behind this possibility, there is the 
implicit assumption of ill-defined property rights (see Drazen, 2000, p. 444) or, 
equivalently, the assumption that political decision-makers allow rent seeking in the first 
place (see Hillman and Ursprung, 2000, p. 204, and Hillman, 2003, pp. 457-8). As in 
most of the related literature, we took this possibility as given and studied its 
implications.   
Individuals would be better off if they would cooperate (i.e. not rent seek). 
Nevertheless, for the reasons discussed above, although rent seeking is socially costly, it 
was privately rational from an individual point of view.
17 Rent seeking behavior would 
cease to be optimal for the individual, if common property becomes too low (with rent 
seeking inducing its fall), if trigger strategies could sustain a cooperative outcome, etc.        
We close with some possible extensions. First, while we assumed that the 
technology of rent seeking (see  0 θ  in equation (13) above) is given, such a technology 
can be affected by government policy, trust and social norms, imperfections, etc. 
                                                 
17 See Drazen (2000, chapter 10) for various categories of models of the failure to make socially optimal 
changes. The model used here belongs to the category of common property or common pool models.     
  26Focusing on the role of government policy, governments can affect  0 θ  through higher 
expenditures on the maintenance of the rule of law (police, courts, tax inspectors, prisons, 
etc). Second, it would be interesting to include other types of rent seeking (e.g. legislative 
favours and tax evasion) and study how different types differ in hurting the economy. 
Finally, as always in DSGE models, it is challenging to endogenize tax-spending 
decisions and the behaviour of government officials. This is obviously related to the 
interaction between rent seeking individuals (who enjoy policy favours) and rent seeking 
politicians (who enjoy bribes, campaign contributions, political support, etc, in return for 
policy favours). Here, we focused on how competition among pressure groups, which 
demand tax-spending favors, affects the macro economy.   
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APPENDIX 
 
Appendix A: Long-run equilibrium of (14a)-(14i) 
In the long run, there are no shocks and variables remain constant. Thus, 
, where variables without time subscript denote long-run values. 
Equations (14a)-(14i) imply:  
x x x x t t t ≡ = = − + 1 1
) 1 (
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z n = + − δ γ γ 1 ( A . i x )  
which is a system in  . If we set the long-run   to be an exogenous 
fraction of output, then one of the other five policy instruments should follow residually 
b g r b h i k c k y , , , , , , , , η b
  31to satisfy the government budget constraint (A.vi). We choose the long-run government 
consumption-to-GDP ratio ( ) to play this role. 
c s0
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t t 0 0
0 0 0 ) 1 ( ) (
τ τ
η θ  and   is the mean of the time-series of 
transfers in the data (equivalently,   in (10) in the text, where   
denotes the time-series of transfers in the data). Therefore, the long-run system consists 
of equations (A.i)-(A.v), (A.vi’) and (A.vii)-(A.ix). Only (A.v) and (A.viii) are left with 
unobservable variables.   
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Appendix B: A measure of welfare gains 
Household’s within-period utility function (2), written in stationary form, is: 
()


















µ σµ σ γ
− ≡
−  includes exogenous variables only. For notational 
convenience, we define composite consumption as  t c ≡  ()
c
tt cg ψ + .  
Let us say there are two regimes, denoted by superscripts  A and  , and let  B ζ  be a 
constant fraction of consumption that serves as a compensating consumption supplement 
in regime   that makes the household indifferent between  B A and  . Thus, in each time 
period, 
B




− =+ t u . Using the above expression for the utility function and 





















  32If  0 ζ >  (resp.  0 ζ < ), there is a welfare gain (resp. loss) of moving from   to  B A. 
We choose   to be the existing calibrated structure and  B A to be a fictional structure with 
better institutional quality, namely a lower  0 θ .  
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Description value  Source 
α   private capital share in production  0.3061  Calibrated from 
(A.ii) 
ε   labor share in production  0.6601 
Calibrated as  
0 1
i as −− 
p δ   private capital depreciation rate (quarterly)  0.0175  Data 
g δ   public capital depreciation rate (quarterly)  0.0075  Data 
0 A   long run aggregate productivity  1.0000  Set 
z γ   growth rate of labor augmenting technology  1.0047  Set at USA average 
ξ   capital adjustment cost parameter  4.2300  Set 
µ   consumption weight in utility function  0.3533  Set equal to    h
σ   curvature parameter in utility function  2  Set 
n γ   growth rate of population  1.0014  Data 
β   time discount factor  0.9891  Calibrated from 
(A.iii) 
ψ   substitutability between private and public 
consumption in utility  0 Set 
0 θ   extraction technology parameter  8.4788  Calibrated from 
(A.i) 
c s0   government consumption to output ratio   0.1467  Data average 
i s0  government investment to output ratio   0.0338  Data average 
t d s 0 ) (   government transfers to output ratio   0.1985  Data average 
y
0 τ   income tax rate  0.1600  Data average 
c
0 τ   consumption tax rate  0.1300  Data average 
a ρ  persistence  parameter  of    t A 0.6750 Set 
a ρ  persistence  parameter  of   
c
t s 0.9514 Estimation 
i ρ  persistence  parameter  of   
i
t s 0.9722 Estimation 
t ρ  persistence  parameter  of   
t
t s 0.9070 Estimation 
a σ   standard deviation of the innovation   
a
t ε 0.0212 Set 
g σ   standard deviation of the innovation   
g
t ε 0.0289 Estimation 
i σ   standard deviation of the innovation   
i
t ε 0.0470 Estimation 
t σ   standard deviation of the innovation   
t
t ε 0.0389 Estimation 
 
Notes: (i) Quarterly data 1961:1-2005:4 (ii) Statistics for   are over the period 1980-2005 (iii) Statistics 











y c /   consumption to output ratio  0.6469 0.7416 
y i /   private investment to output ratio  0.2130 0.2130 
h  hours at work  0.3533 0.2941 
n   fraction of hours at work allocated to 
productive work 
Na 0.8672 
nh  hours of productive work  Na 0.2550 
θ  
share of tax revenue extracted by rent 
seekers 
Na 0.3313 
t g r/ θ   transfers due to rent seeking as a share of 
total transfers 
Na 0.4279 
y r / θ  
Transfers due to rent seeking as a share of 
output 
Na 0.0849 
y k /   Private capital to output ratio  9.039 9.0229 
y k
g /   Public capital to output ratio  2.4881 2.4841 
b r   Return to bonds (quarterly)  0.011 0.011 
y b/   public debt to output ratio (quarterly)  2.56 2.56   
c s0   Government consumption to output ratio  0.1467 0.0116 
Notes: (i) Na denotes  non-available (ii) Quarterly series for private and public capital are constructed via 
the perpetual inventory method assuming a depreciation rate equal to 0.0175 (0.07 annually) and 0.0075 
(0.03 annually), respectively. We choose the initial values for the two capital stocks such that the average 
ratio of the constructed series over output matches as close as possible the long run values implied by the 
model. (iii) In the long-run solution, we set the public debt to output ratio as in the data and allow 





  35Table 3. Sensitivity of long-run solution 
 
Behavior of the economy-wide degree of extraction (01 θ ≤ < ) 
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  36Table 4. Sensitivity of long-run solution for output as  0 θ  changes 
 
Percentage 
fall in  0 θ  
 












Percentage increase in  0 θ  
 








Note: The starting value of  0 θ  is its calibrated value (8.4788) in Table 1. 
 






c  0.6069  0.4513 
i  2.9308  2.9323 
h  0.4141  0.8370 
w  1.4118  0.7920 
k   0.3571  0.1678 
g k   0.2648  0.1158 
n   Na  0.6268 
nh  Na  0.2101 
y s   0.0270  0.0270 
 
 






y   0.5144 0.5176 
c  0.8712 0.5323 
i  0.9173 0.5137 
h  0.5114  0.5158 
w  0.8754  0.5196 
k   0.9568  0.9090 
g k   0.9581  0.9522 
n   Na  0.5158 







  38Table 7. Co-movement  ) , ( i t t x y + ρ  
  actual data  Simulated data 
x   1 − = i   0 = i   1 = i   1 − = i   0 = i   1 = i  
c  0.4883 0.5314  0.4339 0.4817  0.9875  0.5483 
i  0.5319 0.5392  0.4725 0.5306  0.9966  0.4952 
h  0.0553 0.1065  0.0338 0.5371  0.9919  0.4832 
w  0.3823 0.3766  0.3181  0.5110 0.9994 0.5253 
k   -0.0277 0.1211 0.2517 -0.3286 -0.0996 0.3176 
g k   0.1966 0.2576  0.3011 -0.1153 -0.0467 0.0793 
n   Na Na  Na  -0.5371 -0.9919 -0.4832 
nh  Na Na  Na  0.5371 0.9919 0.4832 
 
 
  39Table 8a. Response to aggregate productivity shock ( )  t A


































































  40Table 8b. Response to government consumption shock ( ) 
c
t s




























































  41Table 8c. Response to government investment shock ( ) 
i
t s
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Table 9. Long-run welfare gains as  0 θ  falls 
 
Note: The starting value of  0 θ   is its calibrated value (8.4788) in Table 1. 
Percentage fall in  0 θ  
 
percentage 
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